Saturday, March 28, 2009

Too Big to Regulate

Secretary Geitner has recently suggested a "super regulator" for financial institutions which are so big that their failure would damage society.  That is an idealistic, over-complex suggestion.  Can there be any doubt that creative financiers can outwit the control of any government regulator?  Bringing regulation back into vogue would not change the outcome of the last thirty year's experiments in financial anarchy.  The "greed" motivator is all on the side of the financiers.

The telephone system worked pretty well before deregulation.  A slightly less drastic solution might have kicked the company into allowing us to own our own phones.  Power utility deregulation was mostly good at pulling money from our collective pockets to line those at Enron.  The financial industry under Glass-Steagel, the depression era law that separated financial companies by function, was less exciting but worked just fine.

Building walls between powerful entities is less efficient overall, but it does provide natural checks and balances.  The result is an imperfect balance, as we see in our constitutional government, but it limits the harm the government can do as well.  Re-creating distinctions between different types of financial institutions is more likely to succeed than expecting a supreme regulator to police huge, complex institutions.

The correct solution to entities which become so large that they pose a danger to society:  limit their size and scope.  The Federal Reserve Bank is divided regionally.  It's seperate from the FDIC.  We could all do with a little less financial excitement in our lives.  The prospect of B of A being broken up into competing  and complementary institutions does not frighten me.  Teetering CitiBank frightens me.  AIG, where the right hand knows not what the left hand is promising, frightens me.  Get over it, Robert Rubin was wrong here.

Less efficient?  You bet and praise God.  What an engine of job creation, reversing the mergers and acquisitions that left hundreds of thousands of employees on the street.  Huge financial institutions, like centrally planned economies, are impossible to manage.  No one can be aware of enough facts to make the right decisions and limit the risk the institution faces.  If mark-to-market comissions are the way people get paid, they will forever give away the future for millions in hand right now.

Monday, March 9, 2009

Sensible Ignorance About the Mortgage Crisis

Here I reveal my ignorance of law, accounting, and whatever else you want to accuse me of.  But it still makes sense to me in a "best overall outcome" sort of way.

Banks have written down billions in "worthless" mortgages.  Nevertheless, they are holding homeowners (the people on the other end of those mortgages) responsible for the full value of these mortgages.  If the homeowner cannot pay per the terms of the contract, the bank forecloses.  The homeowner is out on the street.  The bank auctions off the property at a value that probably comes closer to what it is carrying on it's books as the "written down" level of the contract.  The bank has basically taken the loss for making a poor judgment in writing the contract in the first place.

Wait a minute.  Do we have to go through foreclosure, eviction and auction to make the books balance?  Why does the homeowner end up on the street?  

Why doesn't the bank, having written down the value of the mortgage, reduce the obligation of the homeowner as well?  Then the bank gets a performing loan with (probably) a higher value than what the house brings at auction.  The homeowner gets to stay in the house.

The sanctity of the mortgage contract is the only thing that is getting protected in the conventional scenario.  Is the paper worth more than all the people involved?